Abstract-Navigating security and privacy challenges is one of the crucial requirements in the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) network. Since electric vehicles (EVs) need to provide their private information to aggregators/servers when charging/discharging at different charging stations, privacy of the vehicle owners can be compromised if the information is misused, traced, or revealed. In a wide V2G network, where vehicles can move outside of their home network to visiting networks, security and privacy become even more challenging due to untrusted entities in the visiting networks. Although some privacy-preserving solutions were proposed in the literature to tackle this problem, they do not protect against well-known security attacks and generate a huge overhead. Therefore, we propose a mutual authentication scheme to preserve privacy of the EV's information from aggregators/servers in the home as well as distributed visiting V2G networks. Our scheme, based on a bilinear pairing technique with an accumulator performing batch verification, yields higher system efficiency, defeats various security attacks, and maintains untraceability, forward privacy, and identity anonymity. A performance analysis shows that our scheme, in comparison with the existing solutions, significantly generates lower communication and computation overheads in the home and centralized V2G networks, and comparable overheads in the distributed visiting V2G networks.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N THE future, Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) system is expected to be one of the most powerful systems in the smart grid by integrating with renewable energy sources to provide ancillary services, and keeps track of the power demand utilized by the Electric Vehicles (EV )/Battery Vehicles (BV ). These vehicles can communicate with the smart grid under distributed and/or centralized V2G networks for charging/discharging their is only used within the local area to fulfill the power demand. The local area where a vehicle is registered is commonly referred as its home area, and outside this area is referred to as its visiting area. A distributed V2G network consists of home as well as visiting V2G networks, while a centralized V2G network is considered as visiting network for all the vehicles [6] , [10] .
In the V2G network, an EV is connected to a Charging Station (CS) for charging/discharging its battery. The EV provides variety of information to the CS, such as its identity, State of Charge (SoC), desired SoC, and charging/discharging preferences [11] . The Local Aggregator (LAG) collects information from the connected vehicles and forwards some of the information to the Control Center (CC) for monitoring and billing purposes. However, it is possible for the LAG to reveal and misuse this information for its benefit [6] , [11] .
There exist various security and privacy challenges in the V2G system that can massively affect practical usage of this next generation technology [12] . The information shared by the EV s and other V2G entities, such as LAG, Certification/Registration Authority (CA/RA), and CC must be secured over the network, and privacy of the personal and confidential information must be maintained. According to IEC 15118-2 [13] , only unilateral authentication (server side authentication) is mandatory and mutual authentication (both server and EV authentication) is optional. However, unilateral authentication is not considered secure, as it may result in redirection and impersonation attacks. It is risky to assume that all the LAGs and/or CA/RAs are trusted entities. As a point of strong security in the future generation V2G network, we strongly emphasize that the V2G system must provide mutual authentications between all EV s and their respective LAGs or CA/RAs in order to ensure the communication involvement only by the legitimate entities. Furthermore, the LAG must not be able to recognize and keep track any EV by its information and behavioral pattern. Otherwise, the LAG can misuse the information resulting in insider attacks.
The existing protocols/schemes do not discuss some of the possible attacks in the V2G network, such as Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), replay, impersonation, redirection, known key, and repudiation attacks. Furthermore, there is always a possibility of insider attacks. Moreover, protection of private information of the vehicles and resistance against security attacks are more challenging outside of its home V2G network, as the vehicles may also interact with untrusted LAGs and/or CA/RAs. Also, since a huge number of entities would be involved in the future distributed and centralized V2G networks, the generated overheads must be kept as low as possible. These overheads have direct impact on the optimal performance-security trade-off. Therefore, a secure, lightweight, and privacy-preserved authentication scheme for the home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks is needed.
B. Security Goals and Requirements in the V2G Networks
There are various security goals and requirements in the V2G network, such as authentication, forward secrecy, information confidentiality, and message integrity.
The V2G network also suffers from various security attacks due to its connectivity with Internet. We define the security properties in the V2G network as follows:
1) Authentication: Authentication is one of the mandatory requirements that enables communication between legitimate entities, and defeats impersonation attacks.
Definition 1: A mutual authentication holds if (i) the EV successfully verifies the LAG and/or CA/RA, and (ii) the EV is also verified by the LAG and/or CA/RA before the actual communication starts. The computed secret parameters must be verified by the involved entities.
E V | ≡ L AG| ≡ C A/R A → E V | ≡ L AG ∧ E V | ≡ C A/R A.
2) Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS):
At any stage of the scheme, adversary A is allowed making a query to learn information about an unexpired secret key. A guesses whether the learned challenge is a true session key or a random key.
Definition 2: A scheme maintains PFS if no adversary A in time t can retrieve the past session keys k, even the long term keys LTK (i.e., the private key of the vehicle or a session key) are compromised, when (i) entities involved in the session compute same key, and (ii) A wins if its output bit b is equal to a randomly chosen bit b selected in query. A, running against the scheme, has negligible advantage as 3) Information Confidentiality: Each encrypted message in the V2G scheme must provide enough security to be indistinguishable from a randomly generated message, considering adversary A has access to an encryption oracle that encrypts messages chosen by A's without knowing the secret key. In other words, the scheme must support Indistinguishability under the Chosen Message Attack (IND-CMA).
Definition 3: A scheme is IND-CMA secure if no adversary A Enc k (.) in time t can distinguish between two chosen messages msg 0 and msg 1 , and has no or negligible advantage. 
Adv ind−cma Enc k (A)
=
4) Message Integrity:
Integrity of each message can be achieved using a well known Collision-Resistant Hash Functions (CRHF).
Definition 4: H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m (m<n) is a collisionresistant hash function if it there exists a negligible function such that for all security parameters n ∈ N,
The advantage of A in breaking H under security notion bh f ∈ {collision, preimage, second-preimage} is given by 
C. Privacy Requirements in the V2G Networks
The privacy of the EV s must be preserved whenever EV s access charging stations. Revealing vehicle's identity to A results in privacy breaches, in which A can track the behavior of the victim vehicle, and performs some unwanted activities, such as linking messages to extract partial secret information of the victim, and retrieving personal and location information.
The vehicle's private information, such as its location and battery status should not be revealed during the authentication. For example, the LAG should not be able to retrieve the location of the EV making a request. Similarly, the LAG must not be able to track the EV based on its battery status. The required information should directly be sent to the intended recipient in a secure manner. Furthermore, the LAG must be unaware of the EV 's timing selection and the choice of operation. Similarly, the LAG must not be able to track the EV based on other operational information like CSID. We define the following privacy properties in the V2G networks:
Definition 5 (Vehicle Untraceability and Information Privacy): Vehicle untraceability is maintained if A cannot distinguish whether two generated messages (with pseudoidentity and/or vehicle's location, battery status, selection of charging/discharging, and expected time information), say msg 0 and msg 1 , correspond to same or two different identities of the vehicles, say ID 0 and ID 1 . The game is over once A announces its guess of the selected message. A scheme satisfies untraceability if A cannot select the correct message with probability higher than that of random guessing. We also define forward and backward vehicle untraceability.
• Forward untraceability is maintained if A cannot determine whether a vehicle at time t f rw (t f rw > t current ) will be involved in communication based on current derived information.
• Similarly, backward untraceability is maintained if A cannot determine whether a vehicle at time t brd (t brd < t current ) was previously involved in communication.
Definition 6 (Forward Privacy):
Forward privacy is similar to untraceability with additional capability that one of two Pseudo-Identity (PID) messages and/or {vehicle location, battery status, selection of charge/discharge, expected time} messages information is given to A. Clearly, now A can trace the vehicle's identity and/or other information. However, forward privacy is maintained if A is still unable to trace previous sessions (without giving a secret or session key).
Definition 7 (Vehicle Identity Anonymity):
In the V2G network, anonymity is maintained if only the sender (vehicle) and the intended receiver (registration authority) can know the actual identity of the vehicle, i.e., EV(ID)
Note that vehicle's (i) anonymity and (ii) untraceability guarantee that besides the vehicle and the registration authority ∈ {home, centralized} V2G networks, no one including the aggregator ∈ {home, visiting, centralized} V2G networks: (i) can figure out the identity of the vehicle, and (ii) is able to identify previous sessions involving that vehicle, respectively.
D. Our Contribution
We make the following main contributions by extending our work in [10] (considers only home V2G network) by including visiting and centralized V2G networks for charging/discharging. Our scheme:
• Provides mutual authentications between the EV and the LAG (in the home and visiting V2G networks), and between the EV and the CA/RA (in the home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks) so that no malicious entity can participate over the communicated network.
• Preserves privacy of the EV 's identity, location, charge/discharge selection, expected time, battery status, and other personal information in the home as well as visiting V2G networks. Each EV 's identity is well protected in all three networks. It also ensures that the LAG and adversary A cannot trace and extract information regarding EV 's behavior pattern.
• Generates lower communication overhead (by transmitting limited information) and computation overhead (by reducing the pairing, exponential, and scalar multiplication operations) than existing schemes in [7] and [16] in the home as well as centralized V2G networks. In the visiting V2G network, computation overhead of our scheme is also better than the scheme in [16] , but is slightly large than the scheme in [7] . For subsequent authentications, our scheme achieves lower communication overhead than these schemes.
• Defeats various security attacks, such as MITM, replay, impersonation, redirection, known key, and repudiation attacks, and maintains information confidentiality, perfect forward secrecy, and message integrity. Our two-factor authentication scheme also defeats insider attacks, when a rogue device is installed in the network, and when a friend of the user tries to connect the vehicle to the CS for a misconduct on behalf of the user.
• Also maintains vehicle untraceability, forward privacy, vehicle identity anonymity, and information privacy. This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents related work with V2G security and privacy issues. Section III discusses system and attack models in the distributed V2G network (home and visiting V2G networks) and centralized V2G network. Our authentication scheme under the distributed as well as centralized networks is presented in detail in section IV. The security and performance analysis of the proposed scheme is evaluated in section V. Finally, section VI concludes the work. Table I shows various symbols and acronyms used in the paper with their descriptions and sizes.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, many research works have been performed on authentication protocols/schemes for the V2G network [5] , [8] , [9] , privacy preserving authentication [7] and threshold credit-based incentive mechanism [14] , privacy-enhanced data aggregation [15] , privacy preserving communication [16] , and virtual ring architecture for smart grid privacy [17] . However, various possible attacks in the V2G network are still not well investigated. One of the main reasons that the V2G network is vulnerable to several security attacks due to enabling IP-based communications [18] . Also, due to the introduction of Internet-of-Things (IoT ), where the inter-network traffic flow is allowed, security of the V2G network will become a critical issue [19] , [20] . In order to keep the system protected against such attacks, various security and privacy requirements, such as authentication, secure key management, confidentiality, message integrity, anonymity, and untraceability need to be maintained [21] - [23] .
A threshold anonymous authentication protocol for Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) is presented in [24] , while a threshold anonymous announcement service using direct anonymous attestation and one-time anonymous authentication protocol is proposed in [25] . However, both protocols are not suitable for the V2G network due to the dynamic involvement of the EV s. Furthermore, an Energy Management Framework (EMF) is proposed in [26] to collect the realtime power consumption status and demand from the EV s and charging stations. However, the framework does not discuss its prevention against security attacks. An authentication scheme in [23] is not comparable to our scheme, as it neither considers important parameters in the V2G network, such as battery status and time to charge/discharge, nor discusses its prevention against security attacks. A study was performed for making a reservation on charging stations via VANET [27] . However, the drawback is to include a trusted authority that verifies the vehicle's identity. The user privacy may not be maintained in such a scenario, if the entity is malicious or compromised. Also the scheme only provides unidirectional authentication to verify the vehicles by the authority, which may lead to an impersonation attack. Further, a secure and privacy-aware fair billing framework is proposed for an online EV to move through charging plates installed under the road [28] . However, the scheme does not consider discharging of the vehicle. In addition, the idea of installing charging plates under the road is in the early phase and requires a huge setup cost.
A role-dependent privacy-preservation scheme (ROPS) [8] uses three BV roles, i.e., energy demand, energy storage, and energy supply. Similarly, a battery status-aware authentication scheme [9] uses charging, fully charged, and discharging status of the battery. Further, an aggregated-proofs based privacypreserving authentication scheme (AP3A) [7] achieves secure identification of the BV by verifying a group of EV s and establishing an aggregated-proof. However, all protocols/schemes generate huge overheads and do not entirely fit in the V2G network where a fast and efficient authentication is required.
A batch authentication protocol (UBAPV2G) [5] takes into account the vehicle communication in order to provide authentication in the V2G network. However, the scheme is just a variant of standard DSA algorithm and does not consider the important aspects in the V2G network, such as privacypreservation of vehicle's sensitive information, prevention against various security attacks, and key management for secure communication. Privacy of the users and communication security of the smart grid are studied in [15] where a batch-oriented power-usage data aggregation scheme for the smart grid is proposed. However, the scheme discusses a generic adversary model without any security attack scenario, and does not provide mutual authentication. Further, a precise reward scheme for the V2G network [16] provides privacy protection by verifying the generated permit and rewarding the BV s later when they wish to disconnect. However, the scheme generates a large overhead. Moreover, to protect sensitive energy usage information of the user, a privacy protection scheme is proposed in [17] . However, the scheme is only for the smart grid, not directly applicable to the V2G network. In summary, with the best of our knowledge, one of the major limitations of the existing schemes/protocols is that they do not present security attacks scenarios in the V2G networks and most of them generate a huge overhead.
III. SYSTEM, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY MODELS
This section presents an overview of our V2G system model, and the Strand Space model, and discusses security and privacy attacks model.
A. System Model
Consider a V2G system model as shown in Figure 1 , which includes distributed as well as centralized V2G networks. In the distributed network, a vehicle can also move to visiting V2G network for charging/discharging. On the other hand, a vehicle can only discharge its battery in the centralized V2G network. Our system has three main entities: EV s, LAGs, and CA/RAs. An EV can charge/discharge its battery any time at any CS. An LAG is an entity located between the CC or CA/RA and the CS. We call them, Home-LAG, Visiting-LAG, and Central-LAG, respectively, in the home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks. A CA/RA is a trusted certification/registration authority that maintains a database containing information of various EV s and LAGs. We call them Home-CA/RA, Visiting-CA/RA, and Central-CA/RA in the home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks, respectively. We assume that the LAG is curious about the EV related information. Each EV first registers itself to its Home-CA/RA by specifying the Home-LAG of its area.
An EV charges/discharges its battery from a group of charging stations connected to a LAG, and a number of LAGs are connected to a single CA/RA based on the capacity of CA/RA to handle EV s' requests. As an example, we consider that a single Home/Visiting-CA/RA is responsible for four Home/VisitingLAGs in the home as well as visiting V2G networks. For the [29] and IEC62056 with EV extensions [30] , respectively.
B. Adversary Model: Security and Privacy Attacks
The strength of adversary A is defined by the set of oracles that it can access and is allowed to query. A weak adversary never corrupts the message, while a destructive adversary may corrupt the message at any time. In addition, a strong adversary may corrupt the message at any time without destroying the message. We consider a strong adversary in our attack model. In our attack model, an outsider attacker may perform MITM attack between an EV and a LAG. The attack is successful if A retrieves message information using Enc k (.)/Dec k (.) over the unencrypted or weak encrypted network. A can also perform a replay attack if it delays (T receive = T send + T prop_time + T attack ) or repeats the transmitted message (msg ∈ O L D_M SG) to the EV /LAG over the network, where T current > T old_msg . A can perform integrity violations if it modifies the transmitted messages over the network, such that msg receive = msg send . A can also initiate an impersonation attack if it pretends itself as one of the EV s/LAGs involved in the communication, such that EV = A−EV or LAG = A−LAG, and EV
In addition, A can execute repudiation attack, in which acting as an EV it denies after sending a message (msg) to the LAG such that the EV either owns a valid message (msg) proof received by LAG, or the LAG has received msg by the EV and owns a valid proof. Also, A may generate future session keys based on the current session key (key f uture = f (key current )), resulting in a known key attack.
In our privacy model, original identity of EV s must be protected. Otherwise, A (or even the LAG) can extract personal information of the users by tracing their behaviors. In a computational environment, privacy properties are typically defined by means of games. We consider untraceability, forward privacy, and anonymity properties in our privacy model. We assume that A can eavesdrop communications and can also query all the messages in the beginning. Then, A chooses a message msg randomly from a set and makes a query. A can break untraceability if it can detect the selected message msg with probability {Pr < guess random }. Furthermore, A may perform backward and forward untraceability, in which the internal state of the EV (such as identity) is known to A, and based on the information derived in current session, it can determine whether a particular EV was involved in the past and future subsequent communications, respectively. Moreover, A can also break forward privacy and anonymity by tracing the previous sessions and actual identity of the EV, respectively.
C. Strand Space Model for Protocol Security
We define the protocol as a sequence of events for each role of the EV, LAG, and CA/RA using Strand Space model [31] . A strand s represents a sequence of actions of an instance of a role. A is a set of the elements terms, which are possible messages that can be exchanged between the EV, LAG, and CA in the protocol. A strand space is a set with a trace mapping tr : → (±A) * , where send, a and r ecei ve, a are signed terms as +a and −a , respectively, and (±A) * is a set of finite sequence of signed terms. Furthermore, a bundle
, which is a subgraph of N, represents the protocol execution under some configuration, where E ⊆ (→ ∪ ⇒) is a set of the edges and N C ⊆ N is a set of nodes incident with the edges in E. A node is a pair s, i with s ∈ and i an integer satisfying length(tr(s)), and is denoted as n ∈ s. Also, assume T ∈ A is the set of atomic messages, m ∈ M is a Text term, k ∈ K is a Key term, inverse of symmetric key k is k −1 , and K A is a key space of the keys known to adversary A.
IV. PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
This section presents a preliminary discussion on bilinear pairing as well as proposes an authentication scheme in the home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks. We assume that each EV has a tamper-proof device that is responsible for all cryptographic-related computations, such as storage of secret keys and algorithms, generation of Pseudo-Identities (PIDs) of EV s, and encrypting and signing the messages.
A. Preliminaries
Preliminaries include our bilinear pairing technique and dynamic accumulator.
1) Bilinear Pairing:
We define the bilinear pairing of our system as follows:
Definition 8: Let G 1 and G 2 be cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p generated by g 1 and g 2 for which there exists an isomorphism ϕ : G 2 → G 1 such that ϕ(g 2 ) = g 1 . Consider P ∈ G 1 and Q ∈ G 2 . Let G T be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order p where e: G 1 × G 2 → G T is a bilinear pairing with the following properties:
Properties:
There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q), ∀P ∈ G 1 and Q ∈ G 2 .
Domain of hash functions are as follows:
Various input parameters of each hash function (including integer modulo prime p and elliptic group) are converted in bit-string, and then it produces 256-bit output by SHA256 [32] . Further, we define a bilinear pairing instance generator that takes a security parameter l as input and returns a uniformly random tuple t = ( p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g 1 , g 2 ) of bilinear pairing parameters such that p grows exponentially with l.
2) Accumulator From Bilinear Pairing: An accumulator is a one-way function that verifies whether a candidate is a member of a given set without revealing the identity of other members in a set. We define a dynamic accumulator for our system. Let N be the set of positive integers.
Definition 9: An accumulator is a tuple ({X l } l∈N , {F l } l∈N ), where {X l } l∈N is the value domain of the accumulator, and {F l } l∈N is a sequence of the families of pairs of functions such that each ( f, g) ∈ F l is defined as f :
function [33] , [34] . The following properties are satisfied:
There exists an efficient algorithm that takes a security parameter l as input and outputs a random element ( f, g) ∈ R F l with auxiliary information β.
(ii) Quasi Commutativity:
is computable in polynomial time in l, even without the knowledge of β, where X = {x 1 , . . . , x q } ⊂ X l .
B. Our Scheme in the Home V2G Network
We present the details of our scheme including initial setup, EV registration, and scheme execution, as shown in Figure 2 . In our scheme, a dynamic accumulator is used by the Home-LAG and the Home-CA/RA in order to verify whether an EV belongs to a set of all registered EV s at that point of time. Further, a bilinear pairing map is used to generate a shared secret key between the EV and the Home-LAG. This key is used for all subsequent authentications within a session. In addition, a hash of signatures are used to provide nonrepudiation and confidentiality of the transmitted messages.
1) Initial Setup: All EV s, LAGs, and CA/RA (in all three networks) randomly generate their private keys as S EV , S LAG , S CA ∈ R Z * p , and further compute their public keys as
, and Q CA = g S CA 2 , respectively, where g 2 ∈ G 2 . These public keys are stored in an off-line key repos-
2) EV Registration: First of all, each EV i has to register itself with the Home-CA/RA of its home area. This registration can be done either by physically reaching Home-CA/RA or remotely using a pre-shared login credentials. Each EV i generates a random secret α i ∈ R Z * p and computes i = g 
Definition 11 (EV's Addition
The ξ is a witness for the fact that PID i ∈ PID has been accumulated in μ whenever g(
After performing operations by the EV j within a session, its PID j must be deleted and the updated μ is computed as μ = g( f (g 2 , PID\{PID j })) = μ/PID j . Here, the value ξ is such that μ = g( f (g −1 (ξ ), PID i ) ), where ξ = ξ /PID j .
3) Home-CA/RA and Home-LAG Communication: Whenever a new EV j is registered at Home-CA/RA, the Home-CA/RA updates the Home-LAG by transmitting updated μ, i.e., μ as μ .H(σ CA-LAG ) where a signature σ CA-LAG = (Q LAG ) S CA . The Home-CA/RA also generates a random λ ∈ Z * p for each associated LAG and sends it (only first time) to the respective LAG. On receiving, the Home-LAG extracts μ using its signature's hash as μ /H(σ LAG-CA ), where σ LAG-CA = (Q CA ) S LAG .
Msg-(3): Home-CA/RA → Home-LAG: {μ , λ} As shown in Figure 3 , the Home-CA/RA sends a unique λ i ∈ Z * p to each associated LAG along with updated μ of the registered EV s served by the respective LAGs. During first authentication, a shared secret key k is generated at EV j and Home-LAG. For all the subsequent authentication requests, the EV j sends E k [PID j , T j ] to the Home-LAG as message (7) in our scheme (discussed in the next subsection). ∈ G 1 . Thereafter, the EV j sends γ j to the Home-LAG along with its PID j , a timestamp T 1 , and a hash value
Msg- (5) 
p is a random number, and
LAG ), and checks whether H( f 1 ) key) holds, the Home-LAG is authenticated by the EV j . The r j is associated with session key k at Home-LAG and this key can be used for further communications within a session. The Home-LAG keeps PID j in its database until the expiry (session time) of the key k. Further, the EV j computes δ j = x j + λ(α j + PID j ) and sends it to the Home-LAG.
Msg- (7) 
If it holds, all EV i are successfully verified. Otherwise, one or more EV i are invalid. In such a case, invalid requests need to be located and removed from a batch. Then, a re-batch verification is performed. The detection of invalid requests can be performed using a divide and conquer approach described in [36] . Similarly, different LAGs connected to a Home-CA/RA send the received EV i 's information to the respective Home-CA/RA, and the Home-CA/RA verifies all the requests as shown in Figure 4 . After successful authentication, the Home-CA/RA sends a command that opens a window for all EV i to select charging/discharging duration as illustrated in Figure 5 . The smart grid's CC computes power supply and demand load based on the operation selected by all EV i . All the EV i preferences are captured in a message M i where Figure 2 . After completion of the desired operation by the EV i , the Home-CA/RA sends required information to the CC for billing purposes.
For all subsequent requests within a valid session of the key k, the EV j sends message (7) as {E k [PID j , T j ], r j } to the Home-LAG. On receiving the message, the Home-LAG decrypts the message using a session secret key k identified by r j and verifies PID j . If it is valid within a session, the LAG sends a verification command with H(Q S LAG CA ) to the Home-CA/RA. In addition, the Home-LAG sends a new random r j as E k [r j ] to the respective EV j . The EV j sends next authentication request along with this number so that the Home-LAG can extract respective session key of the EV j . The Home-CA/RA extracts verification command using H(Q S CA LAG ) and sends a command to open a selection window for the EV j . Thereafter, the scheme executes message (9) and message (10) as it is. After session expiration of the key k, the Home-LAG discards k and sends its related PID j and r j to the Home-CA/RA, which then removes PID j and stores r j to the database.
C. Our Scheme in the Visiting V2G Network
In a more realistic V2G scenario, the vehicle may also move outside of its registered home V2G network to a visiting V2G network. Hence, we extended our scheme by considering the Fig. 6 . Pre-phase of our scheme for vehicle mobility in the V2G visiting area network via Visiting-LAG and Visiting-CA/RA. visiting V2G network. As shown in Figure 6 , the vehicle has to execute a pre-phase before being mutually authenticated with the Visiting-LAG. In detail, mutual authentications between the EV and the Visiting-LAG, and between the EV and the Visiting-CA/RA are achieved by carrying out the following steps:
Step-1 (Pre-Phase): First, the EV j selects a random number b ∈ R Z * q and computes a hash hash 1 = H( b ). Thereafter, it sends hash 1 , r j , b, and its Home-CA/RA to the Visiting-LAG, which is then transmitted to the Visiting-CA/RA in a secure manner using their public and private keys. This exposes the identity of Home-CA/RA to which the EV j belongs to. However, it is still very difficult to recognize the actual identity of the EV j . Furthermore, the Visiting-CA/RA transmits hash 1 , r j , and b to the respective Home-CA/RA. Here, r j is the latest number stored in the database with respect to corresponding EV j (message (4) in Figure 2 ) that helps the Home-CA/RA to retrieve the EV 's identity and public key Q EV j . Step-3: Once PID j is received by the EV j , the scheme continues from message (5) in Figure 2 . Following points highlight differences with the home V2G network scheme:
1. The public and private keys of the Visiting-LAG are used (instead of Home-LAG) for computing signatures σ LAG and σ EV j between the Visiting-LAG and the EV j .
2. The EV j computes δ j = x j +λ(r k +PID j ) in message (7). 4. The Visiting-CA/RA uses k received from the Home-CA/RA for the respective EV j by verifying all EV i in a batch.
5.
When the scheme run is over, the Visiting-LAG sends recent r j to the Home-CA/RA via Visiting-CA/RA to store it.
D. Our Scheme in the Centralized V2G Network
We consider that a centralized V2G network covers multiple geographical locations, and the EV s can discharge their batteries to the grid, but cannot charge from it. Having such a centralized V2G network enables transmission of power directly and immediately to the smart grid. In a later time, this stored power can be supplied to other locations where power is urgently needed. In order to attract the EV s for discharging their batteries, a reward scheme can be considered. In fact, an EV can be paid relatively better while discharging via centralized V2G network rather than via distributed V2G network. Since only discharging can be performed in the centralized V2G network, the EV s can be paid on the spot without generating their bills at later stage. Mutual authentication between the EV and the Home-CA/RA via Central-CA/RA, and retrieving PID j and r k are achieved through a similar process described in Figure 6 . Furthermore, a session key does not need to be provided to the EV s for discharging their batteries. This will save time and power of the system when connecting and disconnecting vehicles frequently. The verification of all EV i signatures are performed in a batch.
As shown in Figure 7 , the EV 's discharging scheme under the centralized V2G network executes the following steps:
Step-1: After receiving PID j from the Home-CA/RA, the EV j sends its PID j , T 6 , and H 3 to the Central-LAG, where
Step-2: On receiving message (1), the Central-LAG computes H 3 and checks whether H 3 ? = H 3 . If it is true, it broadcasts a random number λ ∈ Z * p to all EV s that are requesting for discharge within a very short period of time so that all requests can be verified in a batch at Central-CA/RA.
Msg-(2): Central-LAG → E V j : {λ}
Step-3: After receiving λ, each EV j generates its signature δ j as δ j = r k + λ.PID j and a random number r l ∈ Z * p . Thereafter, the EV j sends (δ j , r l ).H(Q S EV j CA ), T 7 , and H 4 to the Central-LAG, where 
Msg-(3): E V j → Central-LAG: {(δ j , r l ).H(Q S
EV
Msg-(4): Central-LAG → Central-CA/RA: {(P I D j , λ, (δ j , r l ). H(Q S EV j C A )).H(Q S L AG C A )}
Step-5: On receiving message (4), the Central-CA/RA computes and compares i g
1 that was sent from the Home-CA/RA to the Central-CA/RA for each EV j .
Step-6: The CA/RA sends an acknowledgment message to each authenticated EV j as (r l ).H(Q
S CA EV j
). Once it is verified, the EV j starts discharging its battery to the smart grid. After process completion, the Central-CA/RA sends r l to the Home-CA/RA to store it.
Msg-(5): Central-CA/RA → E V j : {(r l ).H(Q S
C
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section presents computation proofs, as well as security and performance analysis of our scheme.
A. Computation Proofs
Theorem 1: The proposed scheme in the home and visiting V2G networks generates a shared secret key k between the EV j and the Home/Visiting-LAG.
Proof: Generation of a shared secret key k:
where
Q) a , and H(σ LAG ) = H(σ EV j ).
In a similar way, the other EV s can generate a shared secret key with their respective Home/Visiting-LAG. 
)(g
) λ batch verification at Central-CA/RA in the centralized V2G network can be similarly derived.
B. Security Analysis
In this subsection, authentication, session key establishment, and privacy-preservation of the proposed scheme are discussed along with prevention against different security attacks.
Property 1: The proposed scheme provides mutual authentications between the EV j and the LAG in the home and visiting V2G networks. It is also provided between the EV j and the Central-CA/RA in the centralized V2G network.
In the home and visiting V2G networks, the LAG authenticates the EV j by verifying ξ = g 
where − → x and − → y are bindings (verification information in messages (6) and (10)) to complete the protocol run by EV j − LAG and EV j − CA, respectively.
Property 2: Adversary A cannot extract secret session key k over the network. Furthermore, perfect forward secrecy is maintained by our scheme in the V2G network.
Each session secret key is used for authentications between the EV j and the LAG in the home as well as visiting V2G networks, and is actually never sent over the network. There is no such requirement in the centralized V2G network. Furthermore, even if A is allowed to access private key of the EV, it cannot generate past session keys, as these keys are generated using (μ , S LAG , Q EV j ) and (PID i , ξ , S EV j , Q LAG ). Clearly, past PID i are not valid in the current session. Moreover, old PID i are no longer part of μ and ξ . Therefore, A cannot retrieve the past session keys. Furthermore, if k
LAG ∈ K A , and T i is uniquely originated in , then for all
where − → x is the response received by the EV j to complete the protocol run (messages (6) & (10) in Figure 2 and messages (2) & (5) in Figure 7 ).
Property 3: Adversary A cannot gain non-negligible advantage by performing chosen message attack in the V2G network. Also, A cannot compromise message integrity.
In our scheme, encrypted message (6) and message (7) generate different ciphertexts even by using same session key. The LAG generates each PID using a secure and efficient pseudo-random function [35] . Moreover, encryption of unique r j in message (6) and signature in message (7) are performed by the LAG and EV, respectively, using AES-CTR that encrypts and decrypts the successive values of a counter (ctr ) with AES as
, and F k () are ciphertext, plaintext, message block to be processed, and a function to process ctr , respectively. A cannot distinguish between such streams of equal lengths. In fact, encrypting two distinct ctr using AES-CTR obtain two distinct values, and hence, it is indistinguishable.
Our scheme provides integrity protection by using hash values with each transmitted message over the network. Here, hash function H : A → A, and
where strand with trace for EV j , LAG, and CA are +H 1 , −H 2 , +hash 1 , −hash 2 , +H 3 , +H 4 , −H 1 , +H 2 , −H 3 , −H 4 , and −hash 1 , +hash 2 , respectively. If A intentionally changes any message, the received and computed hash values will not match at the receiver, and the connection will be terminated. Furthermore, a hash of the key, instead of the actual session key, is sent over the network. We use SHA256 hash function (where possible hash codes m = 2 256 with n-bit message), which is still considered collision resistant. The probability of successful attack on SHA256 is as follows:
Hence, the probability of successful attack is negligible as long as 2 128 values of hash are used.
Property 4: Our scheme defeats impersonation, MITM, replay and injection, and redirection attacks over the network.
Our scheme defeats the following security attacks: a. Impersonation Attack: Adversary A must know ID j and/or session key of the victim EV j in order to perform this attack. However, A cannot obtain secret shared key. There are two possible cases of this attack as follows:
• Case-1 (A impersonates the EV j ): A uses a fake PID as PID l with a hash A-H 1 . Obviously, PID l = PID j , and LAG rejects the request and terminates the connection.
• Case-2 (A impersonates the LAG): The rogue A-LAG
would not be able to retrieve correct μ , as H (Q
Hence, the EV j terminates the connection. A similar case exists in the centralized V2G network where the private key of the Central-LAG is different than A-LAG's key. b. MITM Attack: A may try to secretly build a connection between two communicated parties with the following cases:
• Case-1 (Key-exchange by A): A cannot establish a connection with the EV j and the LAG, as it cannot compute
CA/RA ) between the EV j and the CA/RA. Further, A cannot generate correct f 1 or f 2 .
• Case-2 (A as a rogue LAG or a friend) : A may install a fake A-LAG, extracts information provided by the EV j and later uses it to access the system from a valid LAG. Moreover, a friend who has an access to the vehicle and knows security key may perform various unintended tasks. In order to prevent such access, after receiving the message from the LAG, the CA/RA sends an OTP to the EV j 's owner for identity verification. Hence, two-factor authentication prevents the system against a rogue LAG: one by sending an OTP and other by verifying P I D j .
• Case-3 (A tries to extract secret information):
A may also try to extract information from message (7) . A neither can decrypt the message as it cannot generate k, nor can retrieve the private keys of the EV j , LAG, and CA/RA. Hence, A cannot perform MITM attack. c. Replay and Injection Attacks: A can intercept, inject, or re-send messages in order to perform replay attacks. Our scheme resists replay attacks by using timestamp values in all transmitted messages between the EV j and the LAG. If A replays a previous message or injects information to a message at T i , legitimate LAG, CA/RA, and EV discard the message if T i + T threshold ≤ T current , where T threshold is the threshold value of the propagation time between two entities.
d. Redirection Attack: In the home and visiting V2G networks, each EV j sends CSID to the Home/Visiting-CA/RA. Home/Visiting-CA/RA verifies the location of each EV j by matching received information from the EV j with the stored information. If they do not match, Home/Visiting-CA/RA discards the connection. Furthermore, there is no such requirement for the centralized V2G network, as it allows only discharging of the battery, and each EV j is paid on the spot.
e. Other Attacks: Our scheme also prevents Known Key attack in the home and visiting V2G networks, as each secret key k is different and is newly generated for each session between the EV j and the Home/Visiting-LAG. Also, the identity and hash-signature verification prevents Repudiation attack. Table II summarizes security and privacy goals achieved by various schemes, and our scheme fulfills all such goals.
Property 5: Adversary A cannot compromise privacy of the vehicle, as our scheme maintains anonymity, untraceability, and forward privacy.
Privacy of each EV j is protected during authentications over the network. Each EV j 's PID j , which is initially generated by the Home-CA/RA, is actually sent only once over the network. After each session, the EV j requests for a new PID j to the Home-CA/RA. Similarly, in the visiting and centralized V2G networks, the actual identity of each EV j is well pro- 
If EV j is a vehicle of EV strand s and fun(C) = EV, where fun is an evaluation function of bundle C.
where U is an anonymity set. Also,
the protocol of bundle C preserves sender anonymity. Our scheme maintains anonymity, as the actual identity is only known to EV j and CA/RA. The intermediate LAGs believe on only the facts (identity set) provided by the CA/RA. Definition 10 (Untraceability): Our scheme satisfies untraceability as A cannot distinguish whether two PIDs correspond to the same EV or two different EV s.
Verif( publi cChannel)[(ID
Our scheme transmits PID j instead of the original identity over the network. Even if A retrieves a PID j and makes a query from random oracle to generate several PID j from ID j , A cannot conclude which ID j matches with the retrieved PID j , as a unique PID j is generated using a pseudo-random function. Furthermore, our scheme generates a new key for each session based on the unique PID j . Therefore, linkability to previous sessions is not possible. Also, by holding the generated identities and messages during the current session (say time t), A cannot determine whether these messages belong to a particular vehicle after t f rd , as each PID j is independent and is deleted by CA/RA after each authentication. Similarly, A cannot know whether these messages were generated by a particular vehicle before t brd , as each session's identities, keys, and messages are independent.
Definition 14 (Forward Privacy:) Our scheme satisfies forward privacy as A is allowed to trace the EV in the current session, but it cannot trace information related to the previous scheme sessions. In other words, We also consider forward privacy scenario, where even if A is given a breakable ID 1 , A cannot trace PID 1 , as the identity is generated by a secure pseudo-random function. Also, the location of each vehicle is unknown to the LAGs, as it can only access PID i , and not ID i . Furthermore, each session protects secret keys by PFS. Therefore, our scheme maintains anonymity, untraceability, and forward privacy properties.
C. Performance Analysis
The performance of our scheme is evaluated in terms of communication and computation overheads. We compare our scheme (home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks) only with the schemes presented in [7] and [16] . Others are not comparable since the scheme presented in [15] does not provide mutual authentication and is vulnerable to attacks. The scheme in [5] is not fit to the V2G network, as it does not focus on vehicle behavior and V2G security and privacy features. The schemes proposed in [8] and [9] are the extended works of the scheme in [7] , which has a huge overhead. We did not consider the overhead generated by the schemes in [8] and [9] since they generate even greater overheads.
1) Communication Overhead:
Communication overhead is the total number of bits transmitted over the network during the scheme execution. As shown in Table III , the overhead of our scheme in the home V2G network for initial and subsequent authentications are 2993 bits and 737 bits, respectively, which is lower than the existing schemes [7] , [16] . In detail, if we assume that there are n number of EV s that are requesting for authentications simultaneously, the total communication cost (for the first attempt) of our scheme in the home V2G network would be 2993×n. Also, if we assume that r number of authentication requests are allowed by each EV to the CA/RA within a session. For subsequent authentications, our scheme generates 737×r communication overhead while the existing schemes (with no session) in [7] and [16] generate 3392×r and 3264×r , respectively in the home V2G network. Our scheme is efficient in terms of communication overhead, as fewer parameters are required to send over the network. We also compute the communication overhead for our scheme under the visiting and centralized V2G networks. We analyzed that our scheme in the visiting V2G network generates 3649 and 737 bits for initial and subsequent authentications, respectively, while it is 1728 bits for an authentication in the centralized V2G network. Our scheme is always better in the home as well as centralized V2G networks in comparison with other schemes. Moreover, our scheme is also efficient in all the networks for subsequent authentications. 
2) Computation Overhead:
We compute the computation overhead as presented in Table IV for n-EV s simultaneously requesting for authentications. In the home V2G network, the total computation cost for schemes in [16] and [7] , and our scheme are 76×n, 49×n+5, and 39×n+16, respectively. Assuming a unit value for each operation, our scheme is more efficient than the existing schemes. The actual computation time by each scheme depends on the actual time taken by each operation. The lower overhead is achieved by reducing pairing, exponential and scalar multiplication operations, and utilizing hash-based signatures. Furthermore, the computation overhead incurred by our scheme under the visiting and centralized V2G networks are 53×n+16 and 38×n+5, respectively, outperforming the scheme in [16] . Although, it generates a slightly higher computation overhead in the visiting V2G network as compared to [7] . Our scheme always outperforms in the home as well as centralized V2G networks.
3) Experimental Setup: We consider a V2G network scenario with an authentication server CA/RA remotely connected with various LAGs. The specification of our system is 1.70 GHz Core i3-4005U CPU with 4GB RAM and 500 GB drive. We performed simulation in Java with JDK1.7. We implemented H 1 as SHA256 function, which took 20 milliseconds (ms). Further, a pairing function (J-pairing) took 197 ms, while modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication were executed in 2.1 ms and 0.8 ms, respectively. Moreover, addition operation, MAC function (HMACSHA256), and AES with Counter (AES-CTR) encryption and decryption took 0.03 ms, 246 ms, and 0.23 ms and 0.13 ms, respectively. Also, a simple invertible function executed in 0.8 ms. For a single authentication, P 2 scheme [16] and AP3A scheme [7] took 5637.93 ms and 680.41 ms, respectively, while our scheme in home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks took 680.28 ms, 814.48 ms, and 320.33 ms, respectively. Currently, the average mobile broadband download speed on 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) is 10 Mbps [37] . The connection establishment time for each scheme is about 3000 ms, and the total transmission times for all the messages in each scheme's initial and subsequent authentications are computed to be (3000.34, 3000.34) ms, (3000.32, 3000.32) ms, (3000.3, 3000.07) ms, (3000.36, 3000.07) ms, and (3000.17, 3000.17) ms for P 2 scheme [16] , AP3A scheme [7] , our scheme in home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks, respectively. Overall, the total execution times for a single authentication in P 2 scheme [16] , AP3A scheme [7] , and our scheme in home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks are 8.63, 3.68, 3.68, 3.81, and 3.32 sec., respectively. It is clear that P 2 scheme [16] has a larger execution time, while our scheme in visiting V2G network is slightly slow than AP3A scheme [7] . However, our scheme in home and centralized V2G networks outperforms other schemes.
D. Security Proof of Our Scheme
We prove the correctness of our scheme using automatic tool named Proverif. Following are the input and output observed from Proverif : ) . event begLAG(bitstring,key). event endLAG(bitstring,key). event begEV(bitstring,key). event endEV(bitstring,key). event begLAG(msgHdr). event endLAG(msgHdr). event begEV(msgHdr). event endEV(msgHdr). query x 1 : bitstring, x 2 : key; event(endLAG(x 1 ,x 2 )) ==> event(begLAG(x 1 ,x 2 )). event(endEV(x 1 ,x 2 )) ==> event(begEV(x 1 ,x 2 )). event(endLAG(MSG)) ==> event(begLAG(MSG)). event(endEV(MSG)) ==> event(begEV(MSG)). event enableEnc. query attacker(s) ==> event(enableEnc). let processEV = (* The identity and pre-shared key of the EV *) endEV(x_1,x_2)) ==> event(begEV(x_1,x_2) 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented an authentication scheme for charging/discharging of electric vehicles considering mobility of the vehicles in distributed as well as centralized V2G networks. Specifically, our scheme, based on a two-factor authentication, provides mutual authentications between the EV s and the CA/RAs (and/or LAGs) in all three networks, i.e., home V2G network, visiting V2G network, and centralized V2G network. Our scheme is shown to defeat various security attacks, including insider attacks, and preserves privacy of the vehicles by establishing a secure connection to charging stations. Through comprehensive security analysis, we prove that our scheme provides resistance against various security attacks, such as MITM, replay, redirection, impersonation, known key, and repudiation attacks in the V2G network. Moreover, our scheme provides perfect forward secrecy, indistinguishability under the chosen message attack, message confidentiality and integrity, untraceability, forward privacy, and identity and location anonymity. Analytic results show that our scheme generates lower communication and computation overheads in comparison with the existing schemes in the home and centralized V2G networks, and comparable overheads in the visiting V2G network by sending limited information over the network. Experimental results show that our scheme in the home and centralized V2G networks outperform, while our scheme in the visiting V2G network is slightly slow than AP3A [7] , but is better than P 2 [16] .
